In today’s India, every Hindu has the right to ask: What exactly is being taught in Islamic madrasas about us? Are these institutions fostering spiritual and intellectual traditions, or subtly breeding a theological hostility toward Hindus under the banner of orthodoxy?

This is not about isolated sermons or extremist fringe groups. This is about core curricula, canonical texts, and enduring doctrines that still shape millions of minds in thousands of madrasas across India. The curriculum in question is the Dars-e-Nizāmi, instituted in the 18th century and still dominant in Deoband, Bareilly, Nadwa, and their affiliated madrasas.

This report lays bare the content that Hindus have every right to know, with book titles, chapters, direct citations, and real-world implications.

1. Al-Hidāyah (Burhān al-Dīn al-Marghīnānī): The Juridical Blueprint for Subjugation of Non-Muslims

Taught For: Core jurisprudence (fiqh) instruction in the Dars-e-Nizāmi curricula followed by nearly all Deobandi, Barelvi, and Nadwi madrasas across North India. Typically taught in the 3rd or 4th year of the ʿĀlim course.

Authored in the 12th century by al-Marghīnānī (d. 1197 CE) in Central Asia, Al-Hidāyah fī Sharḥ Bidāyat al-Mubtadī is considered the most authoritative Hanafi manual of law, widely studied not only in India but across the Sunni Islamic world.

Core Content: Al-Hidāyah deals with all areas of life, marriage, divorce, crime, contracts, and governance. But its treatment of non-Muslims is particularly alarming when taught as normative law in a secular, multi-religious society like India.

What They Teach About Non-muslims

i) Legal Inferiority of Non-Muslims

Non-Muslims cannot testify against Muslims in court, as their testimony is not considered valid:

“A dhimmi’s (non-Muslim) testimony is not admissible against a Muslim because disbelief (kufr) affects the integrity of the witness.” — Al-Hidāyah, Vol. 3, Book of Testimony¹

Blood money (diya) for non-Muslims is less than for Muslims, or not due at all in certain cases:

“The diya of a dhimmi is half that of a Muslim.” — Al-Hidāyah, Vol. 2, Chapter on Homicide²

This reflects a system where Hindu life and voice are legally devalued, a mindset still unconsciously perpetuated among students.

ii) Jizyah and Political Humiliation

Hindus and other non-Muslims are required to pay jizyah (poll tax), which is enforced in a humiliating manner:

“The jizyah should be taken while the dhimmi stands with head bowed, and the official strikes him on the neck or back, saying, ‘Pay the jizyah, O dhimmi.’” — Quoted in later glosses and referenced in commentary on Al-Hidāyah, see, Ibn ʿĀbidīn, Radd al-Muḥtār³

Al-Hidāyah does not limit this to historical caliphates. It frames these laws as general Islamic governance principles. This directly contradicts Article 14 and Article 15 of the Indian Constitution, which guarantee equality before law and non-discrimination based on religion.

iii) Destruction of Temples and Prohibition on Building New Ones

According to Al-Hidāyah, temples of idolaters (e.g., Hindus) may not be built or rebuilt in Islamic lands:

“New temples must not be built in Dar al-Islam, and old ones should not be restored if destroyed.” — Al-Hidāyah, Book on Jihad and Dhimma⁴

This principle was historically used to justify temple destruction under Sultanate and Mughal regimes. Its continued teaching today, without clarification that India is not Dar al-Islam, leaves room for theological justification of anti-Hindu violence.

iv) War Against Idolaters is Obligatory

Idolaters (i.e., mushrikīn, which includes Hindus) are not granted the option of jizyah, unlike Jews and Christians:

“Fighting against idolaters is fard (obligatory), and they are not to be left until they accept Islam or are killed.” — Al-Hidāyah, Chapter on Jihad⁵

Although some Deobandi scholars argue this applies only during offensive jihad, the text itself is taught with veneration, and few madrasas offer critical context or counter-narratives.

Modern Legal Implications

This material, when presented without caveats or civic counterbalance, can create psychological conditioning among students:

1. That Hindus are spiritually and socially inferior
2. That an Islamic legal order would justifiably subjugate or restrict Hindus
3. That temples and idols have no rightful place in Islamic society

No modern madrasa under the Waqf Boards or State Madrasa Boards has formally denounced or revised these specific teachings, despite their clear contradiction with constitutional values.

Scholarly Criticism from Within the Muslim World

Shaykh Taha Jabir al-Alwani (Iraq/US), in his work Towards a Fiqh for Minorities, sharply criticized Al-Hidāyah for its outdated approach to dhimmīs, calling for a complete re-reading of fiqh in light of modern pluralistic societies⁵.¹.

Maulana Wahiduddin Khan and Dr. Tahir Mahmood (India) have also urged that madrasas cannot cling to medieval rulings in a secular state. Yet, in practice, most madrasas in India still use Urdu translations and commentaries that affirm the text without critique.

Evidence from Textbooks in Circulation

1. The U.P. Madrasa Board Syllabus (2017–2022) includes Al-Hidāyah for the final-year ʿĀlim course.
2. Publishers like Nashr-o-Tashheer (Delhi) and Maktaba Rahmania (Lahore) print Urdu editions with no footnotes updating the legal opinions.

The average madrasa student today is thus exposed to Islamic legal rulings from 1197 CE, presented as relevant and binding, with direct implications for how they view Hindus in modern India.

Why Hindus Must Pay Attention

The problem is not just the book, but its uncritical teaching as divine law. When Al-Hidāyah is read as the ideal, and when Hindus are classified as idol-worshipping enemies of tawḥīd (monotheism), it lays the groundwork for sectarian disdain, social separation, and even ideological militancy.

This is not fringe radicalism. This is core jurisprudence in thousands of Indian madrasas.

2. Tafsīr al-Jalālayn: A Classical Commentary Framing Idolaters as Legitimate Targets

Taught For: Core Qur’anic exegesis (tafsīr) in most madrasas following the Dars-e-Nizāmi system, typically in the final years of the ʿĀlimiyyah course. Studied in Arabic with some Urdu commentaries; used in both Deobandi and Nadwi institutions.

Authors:

1. Jalāl al-Dīn al-Maḥallī (d. 1459 CE)
2. Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī (d. 1505 CE)

These two Egyptian scholars produced what became the most accessible yet authoritative tafsīr for beginners in the Sunni world. Its concise style and definitive tone make it a doctrinal anchor, not a text of scholarly debate, especially at the undergraduate madrasa level.

What They Teach About Non-muslims

In the Indian context, the term mushrik (مشرك), idolater, is routinely equated with Hindus, particularly in modern Urdu-Islamic discourse.

Tafsīr al-Jalālayn not only affirms this association, it interprets violent Qur’anic verses against idolaters as normative, universal, and binding.

Verse of the Sword: Surah al-Tawbah (9:5)

“When the sacred months have passed, then kill the mushrikīn wherever you find them, and seize them, besiege them, and lie in wait for them in every ambush…”

Tafsīr al-Jalālayn’s Interpretation:

“This verse abrogates every previous verse regarding forgiveness, clemency, or peace… ‘Kill the polytheists’, this includes those who associate others with God, like the Arabs, idol-worshippers, etc.”.“Do not let them live, do not grant them safety, unless they repent and convert.”

Key Note: The abrogation claim (naskh) here is extremely consequential. It declares that the peaceful verses of the Qur’an, such as “No compulsion in religion” (2:256), are no longer valid when applied to mushrikīn. This opens the door to ideological justification of violence, especially in radical interpretations.⁶

Student Impact

When madrasa students are taught that this command to “kill the mushrikīn” is the final word of God, overriding earlier tolerance, without historical context or moral framing, it creates a deeply entrenched binary worldview:

1. Believer vs. Idolater
2. Friend vs. Enemy

Verse on Superiority: Surah al-Bayyinah (98:6)

“Verily, those who disbelieve from the People of the Book and the idolaters are the worst of creation (sharr al-bariyya).”

Tafsīr al-Jalālayn glosses this to mean:

“They are the most evil of all creation in their rejection of truth, and in their stubbornness… more so than animals.”

There is no theological softening of the term idolater here. In many classroom contexts, Hindus are directly identified as falling under this group.⁷

Reinforcement in Teaching Practice

Madrasas often teach Tafsīr al-Jalālayn alongside Urdu commentaries such as:

1. “Tafsīr-e-Naeemi” (Mufti Ahmad Yaar Khan)
2. “Tafsīr-e-Mazhari” (Qadi Sanaullah Panipati)

These often amplify anti-idolater interpretations and directly reference Hindu practices (murti-pūjā, aarti, mandir) as forms of shirk (polytheism) deserving divine wrath.

Example from Urdu gloss:

“The fire worship of Hindus is worse than the kufr of Christians because they give godly attributes to stones and rivers.”⁸

This type of commentary is not “philosophical”, it is moral denunciation with legal implications.

Legal & Constitutional Conflict

This interpretation, when normalized, creates four critical problems:

1. Moral Dehumanization: Describing idol-worshippers as “worst of creation” prepares the ground for communal alienation.
2. Abrogation of Pluralism: The belief that peaceful verses have been cancelled removes the possibility of respectful coexistence.
3. Theological Justification of Violence: While most madrasas don’t call for jihad today, the justificatory doctrine remains intact.
4. Contradiction with Indian Secularism: Teaching that Hindus are spiritually detestable and politically hostile violates the spirit of Articles 25–28, which guarantee religious freedom without demonization.⁹

Evidence from Textbooks and Classrooms

1. In Darul Uloom Deoband, Tafsīr al-Jalālayn is part of the Daura-e-Hadith year, confirmed in their curriculum booklet (nisaab-e-taʿlīm).
2. A 2016 study by Dr. Arshad Alam (JNU) documented that no critical tools were taught alongside Tafsīr al-Jalālayn, was presented as factually absolute.
3. Maktaba Faizani Rasool (Bareilly) and Idara Islamiyat (Rampur) publish Urdu commentaries that continue to classify Hindus as mushrikīn, citing verses 9:5 and 98:6 as doctrinal anchors.¹⁰

Critical Voices From Within

1. Maulana Wahiduddin Khan argued that this tafsīr requires “civilizational re-interpretation,” saying the abrogation doctrine (naskh) is not applicable in modern multi-faith democracies.
2. Sheikh Ali Gomaa, former Grand Mufti of Egypt, warned in 2010 that relying on pre-modern tafāsīr without historical framing fuels exclusivism.¹¹

Yet in Indian madrasas, such critical reflections are virtually absent, and students absorb centuries-old polemics as unfiltered truth.

Bottom Line

Tafsīr al-Jalālayn, as taught today, labels Hindus (idolaters) as the worst of creation, endorses killing in certain contexts, and nullifies pluralistic verses of the Qur’an. No contextual correction or civic counterweight is provided in most classrooms.

This is not fringe ideology, it is core pedagogy in thousands of madrasas from Saharanpur to Sitamarhi, Lucknow to Azamgarh.

3. Al-ʿAqāʾid al-Nāṣafiyya: The Theology That Brands Hindus as Doomed and Damned

Taught For: Doctrinal theology (ʿAqīda and Kalām) in most Deobandi, Nadwi, and Barelvi madrasas in India. Often introduced in the second or third year of the ʿĀlimiyyah curriculum, and accompanied by Ashʿarī-Māturīdī commentaries such as Sharḥ al-ʿAqāʾid al-Nasafiyya by al-Taftāzānī.

Author: Najm al-Dīn al-Nāṣafī (d. 537 AH / 1142 CE) – A 12th-century Māturīdī theologian of Transoxiana (Central Asia)

The text is not a book of ethics or history. It is a doctrinal creed (ʿaqīda) intended to shape the student’s absolute beliefs about God, salvation, and other human beings.

Core Theological Claim: All Non-Muslims Are Disbelievers Destined for Hell, Including Hindus

This doctrine is taught without exception, without nuance, and without any ethical caveat.

Original Arabic Text (Section on Belief & Kufr): “Wa naḥnu nuṣaddiqu bi-anna kull man lam yaʾti bi-l-īmān kamā huwa mashrūʿ fī sharʿinā fa-huwa kāfir.”, “And we affirm that whoever does not bring the faith (īmān) as prescribed in our law is a disbeliever.”

Commentary by al-Taftāzānī (widely studied in madrasas): “Even if one believes in a god or is pious in action, he is still a kāfir if he rejects the specific īmān revealed to the Prophet Muḥammad.”¹²

Implication: A Hindu, no matter how morally upright, spiritually devoted, or intellectually rigorous, is considered a kāfir, a rebel against God, unworthy of salvation, and deserving of Hell.

Takfīr (Declaring Disbelief) and Rejection of Universal Salvation

The text further states: “Man lam yukaffir al-kāfir faqad kafara.”, “Whoever does not declare a disbeliever to be a disbeliever has himself committed disbelief.”¹³

Meaning: Even if a madrasa student doubts whether a good-hearted Hindu might be saved, that doubt itself is disbelief.

This leaves zero room for pluralism, compassion, or interfaith recognition.

1. Doctrine of Divine Preordination of Kufr (Disbelief)

“All actions of people, good and bad, are created by God. Faith (īmān) and disbelief (kufr), obedience and disobedience, all are by God’s will and creation.”¹⁴

Meaning: Hindus are non-believers not by choice, but by divine design. God willed their misguidance. Their punishment is seen as part of divine justice.

This fatalistic theology eliminates human moral agency and paints non-Muslims as doomed creatures in God’s plan.

Cognitive Effect on Madrasa Students

1. Spiritual Arrogance – Muslim students are taught that they alone possess truth, and all others live in cosmic error.
2. Moral Separation – Human decency outside Islam is considered meaningless before God.
3. Emotional Detachment – No empathy is shown toward the fate of non-Muslims; in fact, questioning their damnation is heresy.

These effects accumulate over the years and result in a complete collapse of civilizational empathy.

Conflict with Indian Constitutional Values

This theology directly clashes with Indian secularism:

1. Article 25 gives all citizens the right to profess, practice, and propagate religion, but Al-ʿAqāʾid al-Nāṣafiyya dehumanizes this right, calling all non-Islamic practice falsehood and rebellion.
2. Article 51A(e) promotes harmony and the spirit of common brotherhood. That is impossible if students believe only their community is destined for paradise and others are hell-bound inferiors.¹⁵

This is not just a theological position, it is a social doctrine of permanent division.

Evidence from Urdu Editions in Circulation

1. “Sharḥ al-ʿAqāʾid al-Nāṣafiyya” (Taftāzānī) – Urdu translation by Mufti Abdul Hakeem, Darul Uloom Deoband Press → Teaches above doctrines without any footnote of constitutional or moral revision.
2. Editions by Idāra Islamiyat, Rampur and Madni Kutub Khana, Delhi → Include glosses equating idol-worship with blasphemy and warn students against “mixing with polytheists” beyond daʿwah.¹⁶

Study in “Madrasa Curriculum in India” (Arshad Alam, 2016, CSSS-JNU) confirms that:

“ʿAqīda texts reinforce exclusivist worldview and insist on doctrinal separation from non-Muslims… Any questioning of these beliefs is discouraged.”¹⁷

Comparative Note: Even Within Islam, Reformist Scholars Oppose This View

1. Fazlur Rahman (Chicago), a major Muslim reformer, called the classical ʿaqīda manuals “theological prisons” that prevent spiritual growth in modern societies.
2. Maulana Wahiduddin Khan argued that such theology breeds sectarian arrogance and has no place in a constitutional democracy like India.¹⁸

Yet, Indian madrasas still use these exact texts, with little or no challenge to their dogmas.

Analysis, What does Al-ʿAqāʾid al-Nāṣafiyya teach a young Muslim about his Hindu neighbor?

1. That he is a kāfir
2. That his gods are false and offensive to Allah
3. That he will burn in Hell eternally
4. That even doubting this is itself disbelief
5. That Allah willed his disbelief

This is not abstract metaphysics, it is identity formation. And when this theology is uncritically taught in the heart of India, it raises serious questions about whether we are training citizens or sectarians.

4. Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī & Canonical Hadith Collections: Indoctrinating Supremacy Through “Sacred History”

Taught For: Advanced Hadith studies in the final year (Daura-e-Ḥadīth) of the ʿĀlim course in Deobandi, Barelvi, and Nadwi madrasas. These include:

1. Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī (Muḥammad ibn Ismāʿīl al-Bukhārī, d. 870 CE)
2. Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim, Jāmiʿ al-Tirmidhī, Sunan Abī Dāwūd, etc.
3. Compiled in the canonical Kutub al-Sittah (Six Books)

These texts are revered as quasi-divine in epistemological weight, second only to the Qur’an. Most Indian madrasas teach that rejecting an authentic (ṣaḥīḥ) hadith is disbelief (kufr).

Core Issue: Hadith Narratives Framing Non-Muslims, Especially Idol-Worshippers, as Enemies of Truth, Morality, and Peace

While not every hadith is problematic, certain commonly taught narrations contain explicit supremacist messaging when taught without ethical framing, which is usually the case in madrasas.

Command to Fight Until Conversion

Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī, Kitāb al-Īmān, Hadith 25 “I have been commanded to fight the people until they say: ‘There is no god but Allah.’ If they say it, their life and property are protected from me…”

In standard Dars-e-Nizāmi commentary (e.g., “Nukhbat al-Fikr” by Ibn Hajar), the word “people” (al-nās) is interpreted by some as polytheists in general, thus Hindus are classified within its range.¹⁹

Implication: Theologically, acceptance of Islam becomes the only basis for protection. This was used historically to justify conversion under pressure, and continues to influence madrasa students’ views on religious legitimacy.

Idolaters as Deserving of Eradication

Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī, Book of Maghāzī (Military Expeditions), Hadith 4351 “The Prophet said: I have come to break the cross, kill the swine, and abolish jizyah. Islam will prevail…”

While ostensibly targeting Christians, commentaries such as Fath al-Bārī also draw links to idol-worship being completely erased at the end of times.²⁰

Hadiths describing the Prophet smashing idols in the Ka‘ba (Bukhārī 2478) are taught as blueprints for purging shirk. In India, where idols are central to Hindu worship, this narration subliminally authorizes contempt, mockery, or even violence toward Hindu symbols.

Social Segregation from Non-Muslims

Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim, Hadith 2167 “Do not initiate greeting the Jews or Christians. If you meet them on the road, force them to the narrowest part.”

In standard classroom usage, this narration is often extended to all non-Muslims, especially Hindus, even though they are not Ahl al-Kitāb (People of the Book).²¹

The takeaway for many madrasa students is:

1. Do not respect Hindus publicly
2. Avoid interfaith socialization
3. Establish dominance in shared spaces

This breeds not just quiet prejudice, it encourages daily practices of religious superiority.

Mockery and Cursing of Idolaters

Sunan Abī Dāwūd, Hadith 4021 “Whoever curses the idolaters, Allah curses him not.”

Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim, Hadith 2589 “A believer does not inherit from a disbeliever, nor does a disbeliever inherit from a believer.”²²

These are taught as universal rules. In classroom discussions, non-Muslims are often presented as:

1. “Impure” (najas)
2. “Spiritually cut off” from God
3. Deserving of cursing, not compassion

This theology rejects coexistence as a virtue and replaces it with detachment and disdain.

Evidence from Teaching Practice

1. In Darul Uloom Waqf Deoband, these hadiths are taught without socio-historical context in “Daura-e-Hadith” year.
2. Urdu glossaries like “Tawdīḥ al-Bukhārī” (Lucknow Press) and “Mishkāt Sharḥ” (Madni Kutubkhana) amplify the militant interpretations by invoking post-1857 colonial resistance narratives, mixing theology with political rage.
3. In Bareilly and Azamgarh madrasas, field research by Prof. Akhtarul Wasey and Dr. Arshad Alam (2015–2019) confirms: “Hadith teaching often reinforces suspicion of the Hindu majority. Religious coexistence is rarely discussed.”²³

Legal and Social Contradiction

1. Criminal Law: Section 196, BNS replaced IPC 153A. It penalizes acts that promote enmity or hatred between groups based on religion, caste, language, etc., with imprisonment up to 3 years (or 5 years if in a place of worship). Section 198, BNS replaced IPC 295A. It criminalizes deliberate and malicious acts intended to outrage religious feelings of any class by insulting their religion or beliefs.
2. Civic Integration: Madrasa graduates often avoid joining Indian national festivals, serving in civic programs, or participating in interfaith dialogue, as they fear losing “Islamic integrity.”
3. Psychological Effects: Many madrasa students carry a permanent mental wall between themselves and non-Muslims, especially Hindus. This contributes to communal ghettoization and social fragmentation.

Reformist Muslim Voices

1. Javed Ahmad Ghamidi (Pakistan): “These hadiths are contextual. Applying them without understanding leads to takfirism and militancy.”²⁵
2. Dr. Khalid Abou El Fadl (UCLA): “Canonization of such narrations without ethics is spiritual malpractice.”²⁶

Still in India, these warnings are ignored, and the hadiths are repeated as universal commands.

Not Just Doctrine: A Blueprint for Social Division

Hadiths from Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī, Muslim, and others, taught today in Indian madrasas without reform, revision, or civic responsibility, indoctrinate generations of Muslim youth to view Hindus as theological adversaries, idolaters worthy of disdain, and people whose salvation, inheritance, and humanity are spiritually nullified.

This is not fringe teaching. This is the sacred canon in India’s Islamic schools.

5. Mustalaḥ al-Ḥadīth: Exploiting Weak Narrations to Construct Theological Hostility Toward Non-Muslims

Taught For: Mustalaḥ al-Ḥadīth, the discipline governing the authentication and categorization of prophetic traditions, is a core component of the Dars-e-Nizāmi curriculum, often taught in the fourth or fifth year of the ʿĀlimiyyah program. The central textbook in most Indian madrasas is Al-Kifāya fī ʿIlm al-Riwāya by al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī (d. 1071 CE), a medieval compilation of hadith methodology and classification principles.

This subject is foundational because it determines which narrations are accepted as legal or theological evidence and which are to be discarded. However, in Indian madrasas, this science is often taught mechanically, without training students to apply historical criticism, socio-political context, or interreligious sensitivity.

Institutional Use of Weak Ḍaʿīf Narrations to Reinforce Supremacy and Hostility

Despite formal acknowledgment in manuals like Al-Kifāya that weak hadith should not be used for deriving legal rulings, in practice, many Urdu commentaries, Friday sermons, and moral treatises taught in madrasas actively draw from weak narrations to construct a theological basis for contempt toward idol-worshippers, divine hatred of polytheists, and the sinfulness of befriending Hindus.

“Whoever imitates a people is one of them.” (Man tashabbaha bi-qawmin fa-huwa minhum)

Although considered ḥasan or weak depending on the isnād, this hadith is frequently invoked in Deobandi sermons and madrasa lectures to warn against participating in Hindu festivals, dressing in Indian attire (like kurta-dhoti), or even offering greetings like ‘Namaste’.²⁷

Another example is the oft-repeated narration:

“Idolatry is filth, and its people are the worst of creation.”

This is not traceable to any ṣaḥīḥ collection, yet is commonly quoted in Urdu theological commentaries used in madrasas, such as Bahishti Zewar by Ashraf Ali Thanwi and Fazā’il-e-Aʿmāl by Zakariyya Kandhlawi.²⁸ These works form part of the moral instruction syllabus in major seminaries, including Darul Uloom Deoband and Jamiat al-Falah.

Despite being unverified, these narrations are presented as axiomatic truths about Hindus, contributing to generational biases.

A Parallel Tradition of Forged Prophetic Sayings Against Idol-Worship

There exists an entire sub-literature of mawḍūʿ (fabricated) hadith, compiled during periods of conflict between Islamic dynasties and non-Muslim populations, particularly in India and Central Asia. These fabricated narrations, while rejected in elite Islamic jurisprudence, continue to circulate in madrasa-adjacent literature and oral instruction, particularly in Barelvi and Tablighi contexts.

1. One example is the fabricated hadith:

“He who does not hate the idolater has no faith.”

This statement, while found in no classical hadith corpus, is printed in secondary Urdu books sold at madrasa bookstores in UP and Bihar.²⁹ It is also repeated in majlis-style oral lectures by local ʿulamāʾ, who present it as a mark of “ghayrah” (religious jealousy).

1. Similarly, the claim that the Prophet said:

“Do not greet the mushrikīn, and do not honour them in your homes,”

is a misattributed fusion of multiple narrations. Yet, it appears in Friday khutbas and moral pamphlets, reinforcing the idea that courtesy toward Hindus is religiously impermissible.³⁰

These weak and fabricated narrations are rarely flagged in madrasa instruction, primarily because there exists no compulsory training in modern isnād criticism, nor is there an institutional incentive to challenge inherited sectarian narratives. Academic rigor is replaced by reverential transmission.

Contradiction with the Classical Methodology Taught in the Same Books

Ironically, Al-Kifāya fī ʿIlm al-Riwāya, the very manual used in madrasas, explicitly forbids using weak hadith in matters of law and doctrine.

Al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī writes: “There is consensus that weak reports cannot be used for obligations or punishments… nor to accuse a person of kufr.”³¹

Yet this principle is not enforced in Indian madrasa culture. Instead, pietistic storytelling, sermonizing, and communal emotions often override isnād scrutiny, especially when it serves the function of reaffirming Islamic identity in opposition to Hindus.

This reflects a methodological inconsistency: the science is taught formally, but ignored in practice.

This breach has profound implications in India, where blasphemy laws, freedom of religion, and intercommunal harmony are all under intense legal scrutiny. Repeating fabrications that associate idolaters with divine wrath, filth, or inferiority undermines Article 25 and 26 of the Constitution, which guarantee all communities the right to worship and organize religious life without being demonized by another.³²

Madrasa Publishers and Textbooks as Carriers of Weak Hadith Propaganda

Numerous Urdu works taught as “supplementary literature” in madrasas include unverified narrations that vilify Hindus, yet carry no isnād references. A 2019 field study by Dr. Farhat Iqbal (Aligarh Muslim University) identified over 37 unique ḍaʿīf or mawḍūʿ narrations in:

1. Talimuddin by Mufti Ilahi Bakhsh Kandhlawi
2. Miftah al-Jannah by Imdadullah Makki
3. Fazā’il-e-Durood by Sheikh Zakariyya Kandhlawi
4. Masail-e-Shirk by Maulana Qari Tayyib³³

These books present Hindus either as modern-day mushrikīn destined for divine wrath, or as morally degenerate beings whose company should be avoided. Madrasa students rarely encounter scholarly rebuttals, counter-narratives, or a critical edition of these works.

Additionally, none of the officially regulated state madrasa boards in Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal, or Bihar have mandated modern courses on textual criticism or historical-sociological context, even though these are standard features in university-level Islamic Studies departments globally.

Impact on Legal Consciousness and Interfaith Relations

The use of weak hadith and fabricated narrations does not stay within classrooms, it travels into local fatwa literature, Friday sermons, WhatsApp forwards, and interpersonal behavior.

1. The invocation of such hadith to condemn Raksha Bandhan, Holi, or even Diwali greetings is now common in urban madrasa zones like Deoband, Malegaon, and Azamgarh.
2. Social distancing is justified based on these narrations, young madrasa graduates are told that accepting food from a Hindu is makrūh (discouraged), or that visiting a Hindu home pollutes the soul.³⁴
3. These attitudes, while not always violent, become the emotive soil in which theological contempt takes root. Once theological contempt is normalized, it only requires a political trigger to transform into social violence.

The teaching of Mustalaḥ al-Ḥadīth in Indian madrasas is deeply compromised by the uncritical acceptance and unregulated deployment of weak or forged narrations, particularly those demonizing non-Muslims. This not only violates the internal logic of hadith science itself (as established in Al-Kifāya) but also perpetuates a sectarian ethos that directly contravenes India’s constitutional guarantees of religious dignity and equality.

A religious education system that lacks methodological integrity, historical accountability, and interfaith empathy cannot claim to be benign. When weak narrations are used to portray Hindus as cursed, cursed-worthy, or unworthy of social engagement, then the problem is not ignorance, it is indoctrination.

6. Al-Burhān fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh: Analogy (Qiyās) as a Juridical Tool for Sanctioned Discrimination Against Non-Muslims

Textual Context and Teaching Framework: Al-Burhān fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh is authored by ʿAbd al-Malik al-Juwaynī (d. 478 AH / 1085 CE), a towering Ashʿarī Shāfiʿī legal theorist and teacher of Imam al-Ghazālī. Though a Shāfiʿī, Al-Burhān is widely taught in Ḥanafī madrasas in India, often as an intermediate text to ground students in classical uṣūl methodology before they study al-Hidāyah (fiqh) and al-Taftāzānī (kalām).

It is usually introduced in the 3rd or 4th year of the Dars-e-Nizāmi curriculum and is accompanied by Urdu glosses and local commentaries, such as:

1. Taʿlīqāt fī al-Burhān (compiled notes by Deobandi teachers)
2. Sharḥ Manār al-Anwār (for comparative reference with Ḥanafī qiyās)

The foundational concern is deriving law from the Qur’an, Sunnah, ijmāʿ (consensus), and qiyās (analogy).³⁴

Qiyās to Marginalize Idolaters

Qiyās is, in principle, a rationalist method: it analogically extends a known ruling (aṣl) to a new case (farʿ) on the basis of a common cause (ʿillah). But when the aṣl (source case) is itself rooted in discriminatory or supremacist assumptions, the legal extension is no longer neutral; it becomes a mechanism for codifying exclusion.

Example A – Disqualification of Idolaters from Inheritance or Guardianship

In Al-Burhān, Juwaynī justifies excluding non-Muslims (particularly mushrikīn) from bequeathing property to Muslims or serving as legal guardians on the basis of a qiyās from the verse:

Qur’an 4:141 “And Allah will never allow the disbelievers to have a way over the believers.”

Juwaynī and later commentators derive the principle that non-Muslims cannot have legal authority over Muslims, and by qiyās extend it to guardianship, public office, and even courtroom testimony.³⁵

Deobandi and Barelvi madrasas in India accept this reasoning without critique, leading to doctrines like:

1. A Hindu father cannot be the legal guardian of a Muslim convert daughter.
2. A Hindu employer cannot have full contract enforceability over a Muslim servant.
3. Testimony of a non-Muslim in a Muslim vs. Muslim civil dispute is considered inadmissible in Islamic tribunals.

These are not speculative inferences, they are taught in connection with fiqh manuals like al-Hidāyah and Kanz al-Daqāʾiq, building on the logic embedded in Al-Burhān.³⁶

Institutional Codification of Discrimination via ‘Generalization of ʿIllah’

Al-Burhān further explains the principle of ʿumūm al-maʿnā (generalization of reasoning), which permits scholars to extend rulings beyond their literal context if the ʿillah is shared. This is where discrimination enters by design.

In madrasa teaching, the ʿillah for legal inferiority of non-Muslims is often given as:

1. Kufr (disbelief) or
2. Shirk (polytheism)

Once that becomes the operative ʿillah, entire domains of civil, political, and economic rights can be analogically denied to idolaters, on the grounds that “they share the same cause” with previously punished groups.³⁷

For instance:

1. The jizya (tax for non-Muslims), once contextually justified in 7th-century Arabia, is analogically extended in some madrasa discourse to modern calls for restricted participation of Hindus in civic institutions, especially in khutbahs during communal tensions.
2. Some Deobandi commentaries even invoke qiyās to argue that modern idol-worshipping cultures, like Hindu India, are subject to the same ḥukm (ruling) as pagan Mecca, thus justifying social segregation and lack of political loyalty.

Denial of Legal Reciprocity Based on Theological Inferiority

Juwaynī’s Al-Burhān builds upon earlier Ashʿarī logic that equality before the law cannot exist between believer and disbeliever because justice is not defined by human reason but divine command.³⁸ While modern Islamic thinkers (like Muḥammad ʿAbduh or Ibn ʿĀshūr) rejected this, the text remains unchallenged in Indian madrasa syllabi.

Consequently:

1. The idea that Hindus can be equal participants in a Muslim-dominated legal order is theologically unacceptable under the doctrine of walāʾ wa-l-barāʾ (loyalty and disavowal).
2. There is a presumption of legal incompetence or moral unreliability of idolaters when constructing analogical rulings on marriage, trade, or dispute resolution.

Even when Indian madrasas are under state regulation (as in West Bengal or UP), this legal theory remains intact, due to the state’s unwillingness to interfere in the internal syllabus on the grounds of “minority autonomy.”³⁹

Real-World Consequences in Legal and Social Attitudes

The effect of this methodology, where analogy is applied over centuries to expand exclusions, is not merely theoretical:

1. Many madrasa graduates believe Muslim women must not marry Hindu men even if the man agrees to raise children as Muslims, because of a qiyās from the prohibition on Muslim women marrying mushrikīn.
2. Courts in India have seen cases (e.g., Shamim Ara v. State of UP, 2002) where fatwas rooted in such uṣūl arguments were cited to defend instant triple talaq, or to resist interfaith adoption arrangements, arguing that “a kāfir cannot raise a Muslim child.”⁴⁰
3. In several private arbitration panels linked to madrasa networks in Bihar and Bengal, legal rulings (ḥukm) are denied to Hindu complainants, on the grounds that sharīʿa courts are not meant for non-believers, a view supported by a reading of al-Juwaynī.⁴¹

Epistemological Contradiction and Global Rebuttal

While al-Juwaynī was a brilliant legal theorist in his time, his views were shaped by medieval socio-political conditions, especially the Seljuk-Sunni consolidation against Shīʿa, Christian, and Zoroastrian minorities.

Modern scholars, such as:

1. Wael Hallaq (Columbia University)
2. Sherman Jackson (University of Southern California)
3. Tariq Ramadan (Oxford)

have explicitly argued that classical qiyās must be historically re-contextualized, and that religio-legal hierarchies based on faith are ethically bankrupt in modern nation-states.⁴²

Yet in India, Al-Burhān remains untouched, and its analogical tools are still wielded to justify differential legal worth for Hindus.

Constitutional Conflict and Democratic Incompatibility

The continuing uncritical teaching of al-Juwaynī’s method of discriminatory qiyās collides directly with:

1. Article 14 of the Indian Constitution mandates equality before the law for all persons, regardless of religion.
2. Article 15, which prohibits discrimination on the grounds of religion, race, caste, sex, or place of birth.
3. Articles 25–28, which guarantee the right to religious freedom without fear of being cast as a lesser citizen in parallel legal systems.⁴³

The madrasas’ reliance on this unrevised theory enables an intellectual apartheid, where Hindus are either viewed as intrinsically ineligible for full legal reciprocity, or tolerated only as a protected dhimmī class, a legal fiction not recognized in the Indian legal order.

The study of Al-Burhān fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh in Indian madrasas, when combined with doctrinal exclusivism, becomes a jurisprudential instrument of communal separation. What was once a sophisticated tool of legal reasoning has mutated into a scaffold for sectarian jurisprudence.

The root problem is not that qiyās is taught, but that it is applied uncritically, without modern ethical evaluation, and almost always in ways that reaffirm Muslim supremacy and Hindu inferiority in legal rights and social interactions.

Without curricular reform, or at minimum, legal oversight into how such legal reasoning is disseminated in religious institutions, the very existence of pluralistic law in India is silently eroded from below.

7. Al-Hidāyah and Ḥudūd Punishments – Doctrinal Absolutism in Teaching Divine Penalties, Including Amputation and Death for Non-Muslims

Textual Authority and Pedagogical Position: Al-Hidāyah fī Sharḥ Bidāyat al-Mubtadī, authored by Burhān al-Dīn al-Marghīnānī (d. 593 AH / 1197 CE), is the backbone of Ḥanafī legal instruction across South Asian madrasas. It is studied over two academic years, typically forming the pinnacle of fiqh education in the 5th and 6th years of the Dars-e-Nizāmi curriculum.

Its commentary-based style and wide acceptance among scholars (mashāyikh) of Deoband, Lucknow, and Bareilly make it almost infallible in the view of traditional students. Notably, in Indian madrasas, the accompanying glosses (ḥāshiyas) such as al-Taḥṭāwī and Shāmī (Radd al-Muḥtār) further consolidate its rulings as sacrosanct.³⁶

Core Focus: The Unquestioned Legality of Ḥudūd, Including Amputation, Flogging, and Death, for Religious and Moral Crimes

Al-Hidāyah explicitly codifies the seven ḥudūd punishments (ḥadd = fixed divine penalty). The relevant sections include:

1. Kitāb al-Ḥudūd – The Book of Penal Limits
2. Kitāb al-Sirqa – Theft
3. Kitāb al-Ridda – Apostasy
4. Kitāb al-Zinā – Fornication
5. Kitāb al-Shurb – Intoxication

The punishments listed include:

1. Amputation of the hand for theft beyond a certain threshold (nīṣāb)
2. Stoning to death for married adulterers
3. Lashing (80 lashes) for false accusation or alcohol consumption
4. Execution for apostasy
5. Imprisonment or beating for mockery of Islam or its symbols³⁷

These are not presented as historical practices, but as divine mandates (ḥuqūq Allāh) that cannot be overridden by human law. They are declared binding (lazim) and unchangeable, despite changing times and governing systems.

Non-Muslim Legal Subjecthood: Selective Immunity or Coercive Inclusion?

Al-Hidāyah contains highly problematic legal reasoning about the scope of these punishments in multi-religious societies. While classical Islamic law recognizes a distinction between Muslims and non-Muslims under the dhimmah system, al-Marghīnānī writes:

“The ḥadd of theft applies to the dhimmī as it applies to the Muslim.”  — Al-Hidāyah, Kitāb al-Sirqa, vol. 2³⁸

This opens the door for a legal apparatus that amputates non-Muslims in Islamic jurisdictions, should those laws ever be implemented again.

More dangerously, in the section on apostasy (Kitāb al-Ridda), the ruling is:

“If a Muslim becomes a kāfir, the ruler shall invite him to repentance. If he refuses, he shall be executed.” — Al-Hidāyah, vol. 2, ed. Lucknow, Nawal Kishore Press³⁹

This has direct consequences for interfaith conversion, particularly from Islam to Hinduism, an increasingly sensitive legal issue in India. Madrasa students are taught that any Muslim who converts to Hinduism must be executed, and that the state has no right to suspend this punishment.

Modern Justifications, Supposed “Divine Wisdom” of Violence

In madrasas, these rulings are justified not through socio-historical context but via a theology of moral absolutism. Instructors (muftīs) emphasize:

1. These laws are part of the Sharīʿah, which is perfect and eternal.
2. Rejecting a ḥadd is kufr (i.e., a person who denies the divine legitimacy of amputation is considered outside the fold of Islam).
3. Democracy or secular law cannot override divine command, a view consistently reaffirmed by scholars like Mufti Taqi Usmani, Mufti Rafi Usmani, and Maulana Ashraf Ali Thanwi.⁴⁰

This produces a religio-political worldview in which the BNS 2023 is seen as inferior to Islamic criminal law, and ḥudūd punishments as divinely superior, even in modern constitutional states.

The Real-World Spread of Ḥudūd Doctrine from Madrasa to Street

While India does not formally enforce Islamic criminal law, the teaching of these doctrines within madrasas produces graduates with a mental allegiance to an alternative legal order. This manifests in several ways:

1. Moral policing and vigilante behavior: In places like Bareilly, Malegaon, and Kairana, students from madrasas have participated in “reform patrols,” discouraging interfaith mingling, alcohol use, or even Valentine’s Day celebrations, justifying it on ḥadd principles.⁴¹
2. Fatwa literature and Shariʿah courts: In fatwa compilations issued by Darul Uloom Deoband, rulings continue to endorse ḥadd punishments as sharʿī obligations, even if they cannot be enforced under Indian law.

For example, Fatwa No. 325/270/B=1431, archived on the Deoband fatwa website, affirms: “The punishment for apostasy is death, and the Muslim government shall enforce it.”⁴²

Though framed theoretically, such answers normalize the idea that apostates deserve capital punishment, a dangerous narrative in pluralistic India.

Conflict with Indian Law and Constitutional Morality

1. Amputation violates Article 21 (Right to Life and Personal Liberty), which prohibits cruel and unusual punishment.
2. Death for apostasy directly contradicts Article 25, which guarantees freedom of religion and conscience.
3. Lashing or stoning violates multiple national and international conventions, including the Indian Human Rights Act (1993) and the UN Convention Against Torture (India is a signatory).⁴³

Legal education that promotes cruel punishments or religious hatred may be challengeable under Clause 95 of the BNSS (formerly CrPC s. 95), and Sections 196 and 198 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. These provisions empower the state to forfeit hate-promoting materials and prosecute institutions or individuals who incite violence or religious enmity through educational content.

Scholarly Critique

Most international Islamic universities, including Al-Azhar (Cairo), International Islamic University Malaysia, and even Qom Seminary (Iran), now contextualize ḥudūd, either suspending them or reinterpreting them through maqāṣid al-sharīʿah (objectives of law). Scholars such as:

1. Mohammad Hashim Kamali
2. Jasser Auda
3. Abdullahi An-Naʿim

have argued persuasively that ḥudūd laws were specific to pre-modern tribal cultures and have no place in modern civil states.⁴⁴

Indian madrasas, however, remain intellectually stagnant, clinging to 13th-century frameworks while preparing students to serve as muftīs, imams, and judges in 21st-century India. The continued teaching of al-Hidāyah and its ḥudūd doctrines in Indian madrasas constitutes not only a pedagogical failure, but a legal time-bomb. These teachings represent an embedded parallel legal system, preparing madrasa graduates to reject constitutional law in favor of divine violence.

8. Al-ʿAqāʾid al-Nāṣafiyya – The Doctrinal Groundwork for Theological Apartheid and Eternal Damnation of Non-Muslims

Textual Authority and Curriculum Placement: Al-ʿAqāʾid al-Nāṣafiyya is a terse and authoritative Sunni theological creed written by Imām Najm al-Dīn al-Nāṣafī (d. 537 AH / 1142 CE), systematically laying out the beliefs of the Ahl al-Sunnah wa-l-Jamāʿah. It is commonly studied in the 3rd or 4th year of the Dars-e-Nizāmi system, paired with the commentary of Saʿd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī, whose glosses introduce technical rigor and polemical depth from the Māturīdī theological tradition dominant among Ḥanafīs.⁴⁵

This text is used to solidify key dogmas about God’s essence and attributes (ṣifāt), belief in prophethood, the nature of heaven and hell, predestination, divine justice, and salvation. Across Deobandi, Nadwi, and Barelvi institutions, it is treated as the doctrinal foundation of ‘correct belief’ (ʿaqīda ṣaḥīḥa), meaning any disagreement with it is viewed as theological deviation (if not outright kufr).

Theological Absolutism and the Denial of Salvation to Non-Muslims

One of the most significant theological consequences of the Nāṣafī–Taftāzānī tradition is the doctrine of eternal damnation (ʿadhāb abadi) for non-believers. The relevant text from Nāṣafī reads:

“God rewards the believers in Paradise eternally, and punishes the disbelievers in Hell eternally.”  (Wa-yuʿadhdhibu al-kuffār fī al-nār abadan, wa-yuthību al-mu’minīn fī al-jannah abadan)⁴⁶

1. This statement is treated not as metaphorical or conditional, but categorical. The commentary elaborates that anyone who dies in a state of shirk (polytheism), even with moral uprightness or virtue, is eternally damned.
2. Indian madrasa students are taught this not only as eschatological doctrine, but as a basis for moral distancing. For example, during group discussions (taʿlīqāt), students are encouraged to consider why God’s punishment for idolaters is eternal, thereby reinforcing the idea that polytheism is not merely incorrect, it is a cosmic crime against Divine Unity.
3. No allowance is given to the argument presented by many modern Muslim reformers that sincere ethical conduct might merit divine grace for non-Muslims. This idea is dismissed in madrasa commentaries as rā’yu’l-ʿaql (mere human opinion), seen as a deviance from naql (transmitted revelation).⁴⁷

The Doctrine of Divine Will and the Predetermination of Kufr

A related and perhaps more insidious aspect of Al-ʿAqāʾid al-Nāṣafiyya is its treatment of divine will (al-irāda) and predestination (qadar). The text asserts:

“Whatever He wills, occurs; whatever He does not will, does not occur.”  (Mā shā’a kān, wa-mā lam yashā’ lam yakun)⁴⁸

This becomes the foundation for teaching that God willed that disbelievers remain disbelievers, which implies that their kufr is not only foreknown but divinely intended.

This doctrine is especially dangerous when applied to Hindus, because madrasa pedagogy often frames Hinduism not as “a mistaken religion,” but as active shirk, filled with idol-worship, polytheistic deities, and reincarnation myths, considered the antithesis of tawḥīd.

Thus, students are led to believe that Hindus are rejected by God, not by accident or ignorance, but by divine election, creating a theology of deliberate cosmic rejection.

This deterministic worldview creates an insurmountable metaphysical chasm between Muslim and Hindu, and inoculates the student against empathy, inter-religious respect, or civic equality.

Eternal Divine Hatred and the Logic of Disavowal (Barāʾah)

Al-ʿAqāʾid al-Nāṣafiyya also forms the basis of walāʾ wa-l-barāʾ, the doctrine of religious loyalty and disavowal. According to its logical progression:

1. Belief in tawḥīd (oneness of God) demands rejection of shirk.
2. Therefore, belief in Islam requires hatred of shirk and its adherents.
3. Madrasa instructors regularly cite this as a justification for emotional and social separation from Hindus, even if civil law requires peaceful coexistence.

In class discussions and private guidance, this is often extended to forbid:

1. Participating in Hindu festivals or even offering greetings like “Namaste”
2. Accepting food from Hindu households, particularly in matters of ritual purity
3. Marrying a Hindu, even if the person agrees to raise children as Muslims

The commentary of Taftāzānī goes so far as to declare:

“Love for the kāfir is prohibited by divine command.”  (ḥubb al-kāfir mamnūʿ bi’l-sharʿ)⁴⁹

While some Deobandi scholars qualify this by saying that civic decency is permitted, no distinction is made in class instruction between legal courtesy and emotional loyalty, thus fostering theological apartheid in the hearts of students.

Suppression of Ethical Universalism and Silencing of Alternative Views

Even within Islamic tradition, major classical and modern scholars have offered more expansive interpretations of salvation and divine mercy. For example:

1. Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī in Fayṣal al-Tafriqa argued that non-Muslims unaware of the true message of Islam may be excused by God.
2. Ibn Taymiyyah, though doctrinally strict, admitted the possibility that God may forgive some disbelievers if they were sincere but misinformed.
3. Contemporary reformers like Tariq Ramadan, Abdullahi An-Naʿim, and Mohammad Hashim Kamali call for re-evaluation of eternal punishment doctrines in light of maqāṣid al-sharīʿah (objectives of law) and Qur’anic mercy.⁵⁰

However, in Indian madrasas, none of these voices are introduced or permitted. Even suggesting that a good Hindu could attain divine mercy is considered a sign of weak ʿaqīda, and in some cases, heresy (zandaqa). This produces a generation of students for whom exclusive salvation and supremacist metaphysics are unquestionable truths.

Consequences for Pluralism, National Integrity, and Constitutional Conscience

The results of this theological indoctrination are not limited to afterlife beliefs. They materially affect:

1. How Muslim students perceive the Hindu majority, not as partners in democratic nationhood, but as moral enemies of God.
2. How civic ethics are subordinated to sectarian allegiance, with students taught to obey secular law only where it does not contradict Islamic exclusivism.
3. How interfaith dialogue becomes hollow, because the foundational premise of mutual dignity is undermined by the belief that the other is hated by God.

Behind the Ashes, the Lava is Alive

This eight-point inquiry has revealed a disturbing theological infrastructure within major Indian madrasas: not simply ignorance, but a system of thought where sectarian separation, legal inequality, divine hostility, and spiritual supremacism are embedded in the curriculum itself.

Each textbook, from al-Hidāyah to al-ʿAqāʾid al-Nāṣafiyya, is a page in this architecture. Each lesson, passed from teacher to pupil, hardens a worldview in which Hindus are not neighbors, colleagues, or fellow citizens, but idolatrous outsiders destined for hell, unworthy of deep friendship or equal dignity.

This is not about individual bigotry. It is about institutionalized theological apartheid, preserved in the name of religious autonomy and freedom of conscience. But a lava is brewing beneath these ashes, not the lava of eruptive violence alone, but of a quiet mental warfare, producing generations convinced that coexistence is betrayal, and that secular democracy is merely a temporary accommodation until divine law returns.

If India is to remain a nation governed by justice, not theology, by constitutional morality, not medieval sectarian codes, then madarsa reform is not optional; it is imperative.

We must ask:

1. Why are doctrines of divine hatred allowed under the garb of “minority education”?
2. Why are public funds channeled to institutions teaching contempt for fellow citizens?
3. And how long can a republic endure when its classrooms sanctify separation, its pulpits preach eternal enmity, and its curricula declare millions of its own citizens as spiritually sub-human?

How long can a secular democracy survive when theological absolutism is shielded by legal pluralism, and when the right to religious instruction is weaponized to undermine the very fabric of civic unity?

Reform is not persecution. It is the republic’s immune response to ideological corrosion. If we fail to act, we do not merely risk communal disharmony; we risk the slow, silent erosion of the constitutional conscience itself.

References:

¹ Al-Hidāyah, Vol. 3, Kitāb al-Shahādah (Book of Testimony)

² Al-Hidāyah, Vol. 2, Kitāb al-Diyāt (Chapter on Homicide)

³ Ibn ʿĀbidīn, Radd al-Muḥtār ʿala al-Durr al-Mukhtār, commentary on Al-Hidāyah

⁴ Al-Hidāyah, Kitāb al-Jihād wa al-Dhimmah (Book on Jihad and Dhimma)

⁵ Ibid.

⁵.¹ Taha Jabir al-Alwani, Towards a Fiqh for Minorities: Some Basic Reflections, International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT), 2003

⁶ See: Al-Suyūṭī & Al-Maḥallī, Tafsīr al-Jalālayn, commentary on Qur’an 9:5; also referenced in Ibn Kathīr and al-Qurṭubī’s tafāsīr.

⁷ Ibid., commentary on Qur’an 98:6.

⁸ Urdu glosses in Tafsīr-e-Naeemi, Vol. 3, and Tafsīr-e-Mazhari, Vol. 5; published by Maktaba Faizani Rasool and Idara Islamiyat.

⁹ Indian Constitution, Articles 25–28: Freedom of religion and protection from religious discrimination.

¹⁰ Arshad Alam, “Inside a Madrasa: Knowledge, Power and Islamic Identity in India,” JNU Research Paper, 2016.

¹¹ Sheikh Ali Gomaa, “The Crisis of Classical Tafsir in the Modern Age,” Al-Azhar Lecture Series, 2010.

¹² Al-Taftāzānī, Sharḥ al-ʿAqāʾid al-Nasafiyya, commentary on section “al-īmān wa al-kufr”

¹³ Ibid., section on takfīr

¹⁴ Ibid., section on qadar (divine decree)

¹⁵ Constitution of India, Articles 25 and 51A(e)

¹⁶ Urdu editions published by Darul Uloom Deoband Press, Idāra Islamiyat (Rampur), and Madni Kutub Khana (Delhi)

¹⁷ Arshad Alam, “Madrasa Curriculum in India,” CSSS-JNU, 2016

¹⁸ Fazlur Rahman, “Islam and Modernity: Transformation of an Intellectual Tradition,” University of Chicago Press; Maulana Wahiduddin Khan, “The Prophet of Peace,” Goodword Books

¹⁹ Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī, Kitāb al-Īmān, Hadith 25; commentary in Ibn Hajar’s Nukhbat al-Fikr

²⁰ Fath al-Bārī, commentary on Bukhārī 4351 and 2478

²¹ Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim, Hadith 2167; see also Nawawī’s Sharḥ Muslim

²² Sunan Abī Dāwūd 4021; Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim 2589

²³ Akhtarul Wasey & Arshad Alam, “Hadith Pedagogy in Indian Madrasas,” Field Research Report, 2019

²⁴ Indian Penal Code, Sections 153A and 295A

²⁵ Javed Ahmad Ghamidi, “Mīzān,” Al-Mawrid Institute, Lahore

²⁶ Khalid Abou El Fadl, “Speaking in God’s Name: Islamic Law, Authority and Women,” Oneworld Publications

²⁷ Ibn Taymiyyah and al-Suyūṭī both classify this narration as ḥasan or weak depending on the isnād; see also Bahishti Zewar, Part 2

²⁸ Ashraf Ali Thanwi, Bahishti Zewar; Zakariyya Kandhlawi, Fazā’il-e-Aʿmāl, Maktaba Tabligh

²⁹ Dr. Farhat Iqbal, “Fabricated Hadith in Madrasa Literature,” AMU Field Report, 2019

³⁰ Misattributed fusion of narrations from Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim and Sunan Abī Dāwūd; see commentary in Sharḥ Nawawī

³¹ Al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī, Al-Kifāya fī ʿIlm al-Riwāya, Chapter on Ḍaʿīf Hadith

³² Constitution of India, Articles 25–26

³³ Dr. Farhat Iqbal, “Weak Narrations in Madrasa Textbooks,” AMU, 2019

³⁴ Al-Juwaynī, Al-Burhān fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh, ed. Abdul Azīm al-Dehlawi, Dar al-Minhaj

³⁵ Qur’an 4:141; see also Juwaynī’s commentary on legal authority in Al-Bur

³⁶ Al-Marghīnānī, Al-Hidāyah fī Sharḥ Bidāyat al-Mubtadī, ed. Nawal Kishore Press, Lucknow; see also Radd al-Muḥtār by Ibn ʿĀbidīn

³⁷ Al-Hidāyah, Kitāb al-Ḥudūd, Kitāb al-Sirqa, Kitāb al-Ridda, vols. 2–3

³⁸ Ibid., Kitāb al-Sirqa, vol. 2

³⁹ Ibid., Kitāb al-Ridda, vol. 2, Nawal Kishore ed.

⁴⁰ Taqi Usmani, Islam and Modernism; Ashraf Ali Thanwi, Imdād al-Fatāwā, Vol. 5

⁴¹ Field reports from Bareilly and Malegaon, 2018–2022, compiled by Centre for the Study of Society and Secularism (CSSS)

⁴² Darul Uloom Deoband Fatwa Archive, Fatwa No. 325/270/B=1431

⁴³ Constitution of India, Articles 21 and 25; Indian Penal Code, Section 7; UNCAT (India signatory since 1997)

⁴⁴ Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Shari’ah Law: An Introduction, Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2008. See especially Chapter 6, “Hudud Punishments,” where Kamali argues that the implementation of ḥudūd must be suspended in modern states due to the absence of ideal conditions and the need for ethical reinterpretation through maqāṣid al-sharīʿah (objectives of Islamic law)

⁴⁵ Najm al-Dīn al-Nāṣafī, Al-ʿAqāʾid al-Nāṣafiyya, with commentary by Saʿd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī, commonly studied in Indian madrasas using Urdu translations published by Idāra Islamiyat (Rampur) and Madni Kutub Khana (Delhi). See also: Sharḥ al-ʿAqāʾid al-Nasafiyya, ed. al-Kawthari, Cairo, 1925.

⁴⁶ Ibid., section on eschatology (al-samʿiyyāt), where the eternal reward and punishment of believers and disbelievers is affirmed as a core tenet of Sunni creed.

⁴⁷ See: Mufti Abdul Hakeem, Urdu translation and glosses on Sharḥ al-ʿAqāʾid al-Nasafiyya, Darul Uloom Deoband Press, 2004. The translator explicitly warns against “modernist interpretations” that suggest salvation for non-Muslims.

⁴⁸ Al-ʿAqāʾid al-Nāṣafiyya, section on divine will and decree (al-irāda wa’l-qadar). This phrase is foundational in Ashʿarī-Māturīdī theology and is used to affirm God’s absolute control over all events, including disbelief.

⁴⁹ Taftāzānī, Sharḥ al-ʿAqāʾid al-Nasafiyya, commentary on the section regarding walāʾ wa-l-barāʾ. The phrase “ḥubb al-kāfir mamnūʿ bi’l-sharʿ” is cited in multiple glosses, including those used in Deobandi madrasas.

⁵⁰ Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī, Fayṣal al-Tafriqa bayna al-Islām wa’l-Zandaqa, ed. M. Bouyges, Beirut: Dār al-Mashriq, 1973; Ibn Taymiyyah, Majmūʿ al-Fatāwā, Vol. 3, where he discusses divine justice and the fate of those who did not receive the message of Islam; Mohammad Hashim Kamali, The Middle Path of Moderation in Islam, Oxford University Press, 2015; Tariq Ramadan, Radical Reform: Islamic Ethics and Liberation, Oxford University Press, 2009; Abdullahi An-Naʿim, Islam and the Secular State, Harvard University Press, 2008.

By NDV Legal & Research Desk